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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
Should A Cognovit Judgment Validly Entered In One State
Be Recognized By A Sister State?
Atlas Credit Corp. v. Ezrine1
Atlas Credit Corp. v. Ezrine involves an attempt by the New York
Court of Appeals to avoid a Pennsylvania judgment obtained under
a cognovit or warrant of attorney. The plaintiff, Atlas Credit Corpora-
tion, brought suit in New York to enforce two such judgments
obtained in Pennsylvania pursuant to an agreement which the de-
fendants, Ivan and Sarah Ezrine, had executed in Pennsylvania to
guarantee the mortgage indebtedness of a Pennsylvania corporation. In
the agreement was a cognovit clause2 authorizing any attorney of any
court of record at any time to appear and confess judgment on the
defendants' behalf. The mortgage allegedly being in default, two
judgments against defendants totalling $1,318,337.20 were confessed
without personal service upon or notice to either defendant.' Shortly
after the second judgment was entered, the plaintiff initiated summary
proceedings in Pennsylvania to foreclose certain security held for the
debt guaranteed by the defendants. Personal property of one of the
guarantors (other than the defendants) and certain real estate and
machinery of the mortgagor in default were levied upon and sold to
the plaintiff. None of the levies and sales were preceded by notice to
either of the defendants. Since these sales were insufficient to satisfy
the amount of the judgment, interest, and costs, the plaintiff, nearly
two years after the second sale and in order to recover the balance
due on the judgments, petitioned a Pennsylvania court to fix the fair
market value of the property which had been sold.4 Service of process
1. 25 N.Y.2d 219, 250 N.E.2d 474, 303 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1969).
2. A typical cognovit clause is the following taken from Egley v. T.B. Bennett
& Co., 196 Ind. 50, 145 N.E. 830 (1924) :
I hereby irrevocably make any attorney at law my attorney for me and in my
name to appear in any court of record, in term time or vacation, at any time here-
after to waive service of process and confess a judgment on this note in favor of
the payee, his assigns or the legal holder, for such sum as shall then appear to
be due, including an attorney fee (as stated) ... to release all errors ... and to
consent to immediate execution on such judgment.
The wording of most cognovit clauses is similar to that of the above illustration in
that the power or warrant of attorney is specifically made irrevocable. Even if the
power or warrant of attorney is not specifically made irrevocable, in most cases it
is nevertheless irrevocable because it is coupled with an interest in the creditor. See
Barrick v. Homer, 78 Md. 253, 27 A. 1111 (1893) (a power of sale is irrevocable
when coupled with an interest) ; Pyes, Reappraisal of the Cognovit of Judgment Law,
48 IiL. B.J. 764 (1960). See also 47 AM. JUR. 2d Judgments § 1117 (1969).
3. Since the cognovit acts as a waiver of process and notice, the only notice
ordinarily available would be that transmitted by the attorney appointed. As the
attorney is generally not required, either by statute or agreement, to give such notice,
the debtor in effect receives no notice until action is taken on the judgment. In most
cases, the attorney is appointed by the creditor and has no contact with the debtor
and is, therefore, unlikely to know of or interpose any defenses which the debtor may
have against entry of the judgment. Ethical considerations suggest that the attorney,
by virtue of his position as the debtor's representative, has a duty to see that the
debtor is promptly notified.
4. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 2621.1, 2621.7 (1967). Whenever any real
property is sold to the plaintiff in execution proceedings and the plaintiff claims that
there is a balance due upon the amount of the judgment, he must petition the court
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for this proceeding was effected by publication in a local Pennsylvania
newspaper and by certified mail to the defendants' residence in New
York City. At the hearing on the plaintiff's petition, at which one
defendant appeared by attorney, the value of the property was deter-
mined to be $350,000, which amount was credited toward satisfaction
of the cognovit judgments previously entered against both defendants.
Subsequently, one of the defendants personally appeared in the Penn-
sylvania court and moved for a redetermination of fair market value;
this motion was denied. The plaintiff then 'brought the instant suit
in New York to recover from the defendants the balance due on
the cognovit judgments.
The New York court's opinion raised two principal questions:
(1) whether a cognovit judgment entered without notice was a
"judicial proceeding" within the meaning of the full faith and credit
clause and (2) whether such an unlimited warrant of attorney as
existed in Ezrine so offended notions of due process as to deprive
the rendering court of jurisdiction to issue a judgment cognizable
under the full faith and credit clause. In each instance the court
concluded that the full faith and credit clause did not require that
New York honor the Pennsylvania judgment: a judgment that does
not provide a defendant with notice or opportunity -to defend is not a
"judicial proceeding" under article four of the Constitution, and a
warrant of attorney which permits entry of a judgment by confession
anywhere in the world without notice does not meet either the standards
of reasonableness or the fundamental principles of justice and fair
play5 required by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
in order for a court to have personal jurisdiction over a defendant.
In reaching its conclusions, the court overruled its prior decision in
Teel v. Yost,( which had 'held that a cognovit judgment entered in a
valid proceeding in Pennsylvania was entitled to full faith and credit
in New York. 7
Chief Judge Fuld rendered a dissent which indicated that, in
his opinion, cognovit judgments presented no constitutional problems
of the type raised by the majority. He emphasized the debtor's consent
to any court's jurisdiction. The judgment being a fully valid one in
Pennsylvania, comity might prevent its recognition in New York only
if it violated New York's public policy. Judge Fuld felt that New York's
own confession of judgment procedure was not so different from that
of Pennsylvania as to render Pennsylvania's judgment repugnant to
New York's policy. Judge Fuld concluded by suggesting that the
defendants were in no way prejudiced by the judgment since it was
entered in Pennsylvania where the warrants of attorney were executed,
to fix the fair market value of the executed property within six months from the date
of sale. In Pennsylvania the date of sale is considered to be the date of delivery of
the sheriff's deed. See Marx Realty & Improvement Co. v. Boulevard Center, 398
Pa. 1, 156 A.2d 827 (1959).
5. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
6. 128 N.Y. 387, 28 N.E. 353 (1891).
7. But see Baldwin Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Klein, 136 Misc. 752, 240 N.Y.S. 804(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1930), criticized in 44 HARv. L. REv. 1277 (1931) (Pennsyl-
vania cognovit judgment held invalid as against a New York resident).
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where the security (in the form of real property) was located, and
where the defendants would most likely have expected the judgments
to have been entered.
I. COGNOVIT PROCEDURES
While judgments by confession entered under a warrant of attorney
existed at common law,8 they are now largely governed by statute.
According to a 1961 survey,9 only seven states had statutes specifically
allowing the use of cognovits. Fifteen others had declared such clauses
void; twenty-three had placed various procedural limitations on con-
fessions of judgment generally; and four states had no pertinent
statutes, the common law presumably remaining in effect in these states.
While procedural differences do exist between the common law and the
statutory schemes of those states restricting judgments by confession,'"
little protection from fraud, overreaching or economic duress is, in
reality, available to the ordinary debtor. An examination of the various
procedures indicates that in almost all of the "restrictive" states ajudgment "for money due or to become due or to secure a contingent
liability on behalf of the defendant, or for both" may be entered by
confession upon the mere filing of a statement (ordinarily the original
cognovit will suffice) signed and verified by the defendant. Such a
statement need only contain an authorization for the entry of judgment
for a specified sum and a statement of the facts out of which the debt
arose." After these minimal requirements are met, the affidavit may
then be filed with the clerk of the court, who will enter the judgment
in the judgment roll. After the judgment is entered, it is final and
enforceable like any other valid judgment. Execution may take place
immediately unless restricted by the agreement itself.'2 New York is
one of those states which provides several technical restrictions on cog-
novit procedure. Maryland and Pennsylvania represent opposite ex-
tremes: Pennsylvania's statute authorizes the entry of any cognovitjudgment while Maryland's statute provides stricter notice and ex-
ecution requirements than those ordinarily required by other states'
procedures.
8. For a description of the common law procedure for confession of judgment,
see Tyrrell v. Hilton, 92 Md. 176, 48 A. 55 (1900) ; First Nat'l Bank v. White, 220
Mo. 717, 120 S.W. 36 (1909).
9. Hopson, Cognovit Judgments: An Ignored Problem of Due Process and Full
Faith and Credit, 29 U. CHI. L. Rav. 111, 126 (1961).
10. For example, some statutes require that the judgment note be produced.E.g., NEB. Ray. STAT. §§ 25-1309 to -1312 (1964). Some require that the address of
the obligor be stated in the affidavit. E.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 3218(a) (1)(McKinney 1963); N.C.R. CIv. P. 68.1(b).
11. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE §§ 10-901 to -904 (1947) ; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 548.22(1947); NEv. REv. STAT. §§ 17.090-.110 (1969); UTAH R. Civ. P. 58A(e).
12. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 548.22-.23 (1947), which specifically provides
that the judgment, once entered, is final, and that execution may issue immediately;
NED. REv. STAT. § 25-1311 (1964), which provides that the enforcement of cognovitjudgments is the same as that of any other judgment. Some state statutes provide
that execution may only take place to the extent of amounts presently due, leaving alien on future installments which is enforceable after they become due. See, e.g.,
N.C.R. Civ. P. 68.1; N.D.R. Civ. P. 68(c); ORE. Rav. STAT. §§ 26.010-.030 (1959).
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New York has attempted to provide some protection for the debtor
by requiring that he state in the affidavit authorizing confession ofjudgment the county of his residence or the county in which the judg-
ment is authorized.1" The purpose behind the requirement is that the
proper county for entry of the judgment will be ascertainable on the
face of the affidavit and that the defendant will know where to look for
any action by his creditor.1 4 While several other states have also re-
quired that the address of the obligor be shown on the document, 5
such a requirement offers little protection unless accompanied by a pro-
vision that notice be transmitted to the defendant before the judgment
becomes final and enforceable. Without such a notice requirement, the
plaintiff may execute upon the judgment and deprive the defendant of
his property before he has had an opportunity to defend against the
claim. While a defendant might petition the court to open or vacate
the judgment, if in the interim the plaintiff has executed upon it, such
an opportunity would come too late.
In comparison to other cognovit procedures, Maryland's16 appears
to provide the greatest protection to a defendant consistent with reten-
tion of the summary nature of the proceeding. Under the Maryland
procedure a judgment by confession may be entered by the clerk of
the court upon the filing by the plaintiff of a declaration. This declara-
tion must be accompanied by the written instrument authorizing con-
fession of judgment and -by an affidavit of the plaintiff stating the
amount due and the address of the defendant.' 7 The feature that dis-
tinguishes Maryland's procedure from that of other states is that a per-
sonal summons must be issued to the defendant immediately upon entry
of the judgment. This is to give the defendant notice and a thirty-day
period in which to show why the judgment should not become final.
If no cause is shown after receipt of the summons, the judgment is
deemed to be final to the same extent as is a judgment after trial.' s
Until the thirty-day period has expired, the plaintiff has merely a lien
against the defendant's property since the rule specifies that a sale
on execution upon a judgment by confession may not be made until
after such judgment shall have become final.' 9 By this provision the
defendant is afforded an opportunity to defend before he is deprived
of the possession or use of his property.
13. N.Y. Cirv. PPAc. LAW § 3218 (McKinney 1963).
14. FIFTH REPORT, ADVISORY COMM. ON PPac. & PROC., N.Y. LEGIs. Doc., 1961,
No. 15, P. 503. Such a Provision provides at least for the giving of constructive notice
in that the obligor, by searching the judgment rolls, should be able to ascertain
whether a judgment has been confessed against him.
15. See, e.g., N.C.R. Civ. P. 68.1(b).
16. MD. R.P. 645.
17.. MD. R.P. 645(a).
18. MD. R.P. 645(b). This rule's requirement that a summons be served upon
the defendant and its allowance of a period of thirty days within which the defendant
may move to strike such judgment are the result of recognition of the hardships
which were sometimes inflicted upon defendants because of a lack of notice and the
consequent lack of an opportunity to interpose defenses before a judgment by con-
fession was enrolled. Newark Trust Co. v. Trimble, 215 Md. 502, 138 A.2d 919 (1958).
19. MD. R.P. 645(h).
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In contrast to Maryland's regulation is the statute of Pennsyl-
vania, which provides:
It shall be the duty of the prothonotary of any court of record,
within this Commonwealth, on the application of any person being
the original holder (or assignee of such holder) of a note . . . in
which judgment is confessed, or containing a warrant for an attor-
ney at law, or other person to confess judgment, to enter judgment
against the person or persons, who executed the same ...
Even the mere formalities provided by other state statutes are not
present. The original document need not be produced, an affidavit
stating the facts out of which the debt arose is not required, and the
judgment may be executed at any time after it is entered without any
form of notice to the debtor.2
It is the contention of this note that Pennsylvania's procedure,
or any other procedure which purports to authorize the levy of an
execution before the debtor is notified of the proceeding, is violative
of the due process clause. While it may be argued that any judgment
entered without notice to the defendant is a violation of due process,
this note takes the contrary view. It is not the entry of judgment with-
out notice that raises the due process objection, but rather an exe-
cution pursuant thereto since it is such an execution which constitutes
"deprivation" in the constitutional sense; prior thereto the debtor
retains both the possession and the use of his property.
II. FULL FAITH AND CREDIT
Article four of the Constitution provides that "Full Faith and
Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, andjudicial Proceedings of every other State. ' 22 The New York court in
Ezrine initially decided that cognovit judgments are not entitled to full
faith and credit recognition since they are not "judicial proceedings" in
the ordinary sense of the term. This conclusion was reached because
of a combination of factors: (1) the cognovit judgments in Ezrine
were entered by the clerk of the court simply as a matter of routine,
(2) there was no hearing on the merits, (3) the court exercised no
discretion and made no determination, and (4) no notice was provided
to the defendants. While these factors may eliminate cognovit judg-
ments from the technical purview of the term "judicial proceedings,"23
20. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 739 (Supp. 1970).
21. See Note, Confession of Judgment, 102 U. PA. L. REv. 524, 528 (1954), for
a discussion of the procedure for confessing judgment in Pennsylvania.
22. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
23. Sumner, Full Faith and Credit for Judicial Proceedings, 2 U.C.L.A.L. REv.441 (1955) lists three prerequisites: jurisdiction, a decision on the merits, and a final
decision. Under the RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS § 75 (1934), a judicial proceeding,
to be entitled to full faith and credit, must provide some form of notice to the
parties affected:
A state cannot exercise through its courts judicial jurisdiction over a person,
although he is subject to the jurisdiction of the state, unless a method of notifica-
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the Ezrine judgments still appear to fall within the scope of article four.
Even if not "judicial proceedings," they plainly represented "records"
of the rendering state, entered in compliance with one of its "public
acts," and were entitled to full faith and credit on that basis. Ohio v.
Kleitch Bros., Inc.24 involved a similar situation; there a Michigan
court was asked to give full faith and credit to an Ohio tax statute,
Ohio assessments, and Ohio judgments entered thereunder. The court
faced directly the problem of a summary judgment entered without
prior notice, hearing, or judicial determination and concluded, "Even
if we do not conceive of the Ohio 'judgments' as 'judicial proceedings,'
they plainly represent 'records' of that State entered in compliance
with one of its 'public acts' and should be given full faith and credit."' 25
When a state is dealing with judgments of sister states, full faith
and credit may be withheld if the result of such recognition would be
so contrary to the policy of the forum state as to justify refusal.26 In
the instant case, as Judge Fuld points out in his dissent, New York
permits judgments by confession without notice to the debtor; the
minimal procedural requirements of the New York statute provide
little, if any, more protection to the debtor than the law of Pennsyl-
vania.2 ' The procedural differences relied upon by the majority28 do
not supply a sufficiently overriding interest to ignore the unifying
principle of the full faith and credit mandate.
Since cognovit judgments are literally included within the scope of
the full faith and credit clause, the real issue is whether they fit consti-
tutionally into its spirit. Since full faith and credit need only be given
to valid judgments, i.e., those which are rendered in accordance with
due process, if Pennsylvania's cognovit procedures did violence to the
concept of due process, the New York court was correct in denying
full faith and credit despite the fact that New York's own procedures
were sulstantially the same as those of Pennsylvania. This issue the
tion is employed which is reasonably calculated to give him knowledge of the
attempted exercise of jurisdiction and an opportunity to be heard.
Comment:
a. What constitutes judicial proceeding. In the absence of constitutional
limitations, the legislature of a state may direct its courts to render judgment
against a person without any form of notification, and such a judgment will be
valid in the state in which it is rendered; but such a proceeding is not a judicialproceeding and other states will not recognize such a judgment as valid (see§ 429).
b. Under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the UnitedStates, the rendition of a judgment by the courts of a State without any reason-
able form of notification is invalid even in the State in which it is rendered.
c. Necessity of actual knowledge of proceedings. It is not necessary thatthe person against whom the judgment is rendered should have received knowledge
of the action in which the judgment is rendered. It is sufficient that steps weretaken which under all the circumstances were reasonably calculated to give himknowledge of the action and an opportunity to be heard.
See RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 4 (1942).
24. 357 Mich. 504, 98 N.W.2d 636 (1959). See Abel, Administrative Determina-
tion and Full Faith and Credit, 22 IOWA L. Rlv. 461, 495 (1937).
25. 98 N.W.2d at 643.
26. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942); Haag v. Barnes, 11 App.Div. 2d 430, 207 N.Y.S.2d 624 (1960), aff'd, 9 N.Y.2d 554, 175 N.E.2d 441, 216
N.Y.S.2d 65 (1961).
27. 25 N.Y.2d at 234-35, 250 N.E.2d at 484, 303 N.Y.S.2d at 395.28. Id. at 230-31, 250 N.E.2d at 481, 303 N.Y.S.2d at 392.
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New York court in Ezrine resolved by denying recognition to the
Pennsylvania judgments.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that cognovit
judgments, if valid where rendered, are to receive full faith and credit
in every other state and may not, therefore, be refused or denied effect.
For a cognovit judgment to be valid, and thus to be entitled to full
faith and credit, two events must have occurred. First, the require-
ments of the state confession of judgment statute must have been met
by the plaintiff. Second, the court granting the cognovit judgment
must have had jurisdiction over both the subject matter and the parties.
One element essential to the creation of jurisdiction is for the plaintiff
to have complied fully with the terms of the warrant of attorney by
which the defendant authorized the judgment 29 since it is only through
such compliance that the court obtains jurisdiction over the person
of the defendant.
At first glance these requirements for validity appear to have
been met in Ezrine. The Pennsylvania judgments were obtained pur-
suant to Pennsylvania's confession of judgment statute, 30 thus satisfy-
ing the first requirement. The plaintiff's compliance with the terms of
the warrant of attorney was exact, thus presumably creating juris-
diction over the defendant under the established principle governing
cognovit judgments.
Ill. LACK OF JURISDICTION
The Ezrine majority purports to circumvent these established
principles by a finding that, despite the plaintiff's exact compliance
with the terms of the warrant, the Pennsylvania court nevertheless
lacked that jurisdiction which it must have had for its decree to be
entitled to full faith and credit.
Ordinarily, acquiring jurisdiction over a defendant entails some
form of notice to the defendant. At one time jurisdiction was attain-
able only through service of process on the defendant while he was
with-in the territorial confines of the state."' This requirement has since
been modified; today a court can obtain jurisdiction either by personal
service out of state, service by mail, or constructive service by publi-
29. The two United States Supreme Court cases dealing with cognovits have notdiscussed the constitutionality of a warrant of attorney which waives notice in addition
to waiving personal service of process. In National Exchange Bank v. Wiley, 195
U.S. 257 (1904), the Court held that the particular warrant of attorney involved there
authorized confession of judgment only in favor of the "holder" of the note. Since
the plaintiff was not the "holder" but an assignee, the rendering state had no juris-
diction to enter the judgment. The judgment was "in legal effect, a personal judgment
without service of process upon the defendants, and without their appearance inperson or by an authorized attorney. The proceedings were wanting in due process
of law." Id. at 270.
In Grover & Baker Sewing-Mac. Co. v. Radcliffe, 137 U.S. 287 (1899), the
cognovit authorized "any attorney of any court of record.., to confess judgment .. ."
Id. at 290. Since judgment was confessed by a prothonotary rather than by an attory-
ney, the Court held that the defendant had not submitted to the judgment court'sjurisdiction, reasoning that he had a right to insist upon the literal terms of the
authority conferred.
30. See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
31. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
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cation, depending upon the circumstances.82 Jurisdiction is also attain-
able by personal appearance without service of process.8 3 While broad-
ening the basis of jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has emphasized
that due process is not satisfied unless notice is transmitted to all
parties concerned. 4 Not only must the defendant receive notice, but it
must be the best notice possible under the circumstances of the case. 5
In ordinary cognovit cases, personal service is not made upon the
defendant nor is notice transmitted before judgment is rendered. Such
judgments are nevertheless considered valid since in the cognovit in-
strument the debtor specifically consents to the creation of the court's
jurisdiction. Under the traditional view, when this consent is coupled
with the customary warrant of attorney authorizing the attorney to
appear and confess judgment on his behalf, the debtor not only invests
the court with jurisdiction over his person but makes it unnecessary
to provide him with notice that the suit has been brought."8
Thus, in order for the New York court to deny the existence of
that jurisdiction in the Pennsylvania court which was essential to the
validity of the Pennsylvania judgment, which validity was essential to
the imposition of full faith and credit, the court was forced to find that
the debtor's consent was somehow invalid as a creator of jurisdiction.
To so find, the majority held that a debtor may only consent to a
particular court's jurisdiction since otherwise the power of attorney
would be too broad and its use as a basis for imposing jurisdiction
would be a violation of due process.3 7 As support for its position, the
32. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (jurisdiction
could be based on service by mail plus service on one of the defendant's agents, as
long as such jurisdiction was not contrary to notions of "fair play and substantialjustice"). See also Auerbach, The "Long Arm" Comes to Maryland, 26 MD. L. REv.
13 (1966) ; Note, Requirements of Notice in In Rem Proceedings, 70 HtAv. L. Rzv.
1257 (1957), recognizing that historically service of process accomplished a two-fold
purpose of subjecting defendants to the jurisdiction of the court and of providing
notice of the impending cause of action. For a discussion of the conflicts involved in
expanding the basis of a court's jurisdiction while relaxing the notice requirements, see
Note, Due Process of Law and Notice by Publication, 32 IND. L. REv. 469 (1957).
33. National Exchange Bank v. Wiley, 195 U.S. 257 (1904). "[lit is thoroughly
settled that a personal judgment against one not before the court by actual service of
process, or who did not appear in person or by an authorized attorney, would be in-
valid as not being in conformity with due process of law." Id at 269. In the cognovit
situation the defendant makes a personal appearance through the appointed attorney.
34. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) (in
order to conform to due process, notice must be reasonably calculated under the
circumstances to apprise interested parties of the action and to afford them an oppor-
tunity to present their objections).
35. Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1936). The Court held that
notification by newspaper publication alone did not measure up to the quality of
notice required by the due process clause since there seemed to be no compelling or
even persuasive reasons why notice could not have been sent directly to the defend-
ants; their names and addresses were readily available. Such reasoning is equally
applicable to the cognovit situation.
36. See RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 75, 81 (1934); RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 25, comment g, § 32, comments h, i (1967);
RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 6, comment e, § 18 (1942).
37. 25 N.Y.2d at 231, 250 N.E.2d at 482, 303 NY.S.2d at 392-93. In Ezrine the
type of power of attorney which the court held to be invalid was one given to "any
attorney in any court of record." Two other types may be created: (1) one giving
to any attorney the power to confess judgment in a particular court and (2) one
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court relied upon National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent,8"
wherein the following statement is found: "it is settled ... that parties
to a contract may agree in advance to submit to the jurisdiction of agiven court, to permit notice to be served by the opposing party, or
even to waive notice altogether." 9 Of vital importance to the Ezrine
court was the concept of particularity expressed in the words "given
court, '40 while the dissent chose to place emphasis upon the phrase
dealing with waiver.
Assuming that the prior consent of the debtor to a particular
court's jurisdiction would not conflict with due process notions, it isdifficult to see how such a debtor stands in a better position than if hehad consented without specifying a particular jurisdiction. In neither
case is there any assurance that notice, even constructive notice, will
reach the debtor before execution on the judgment takes place. Theissue is actually whether the giving of prior consent to any jurisdiction
can constitute a valid waiver of notice and cloak the rendering court
with jurisdiction. As Judge Fuld points out:
Unless one is prepared to say that all cognovit judgments areinvalid because they may be granted without notice to the debtor
and thus deprive him of his day in court, it matters little where
the judgment is entered. If the debtor has the capacity to consent
to a cognovit judgment and, in effect, waives whatever protection
notice of the proceedings might yield, then, it is difficult to per-
ceive why as a matter of due process - as distinguished from wisepolicy - he may do so in only one specified jurisdiction."'
giving a specific attorney the power to confess judgment in any court. In either ofthese situations the debtor presumably would have sufficient contact with either theattorney or the forum to prevent a failure of notice from constituting a violation of dueprocess if a valid waiver of notice had been given by the debtor. Cf. Gramatan Nat'lBank & Trust Co. v. Barron, 193 Md. 649, 69 A.2d 489 (1949), referring to the lawof Virginia which requires that a particular attorney be designated for the warrantto be valid. The Ezrine majority appears to have recognized that, as long as thepower of attorney is only given for use in a particular court, its use is constitutional.
38. 375 U.S. 311 (1964).
39. Id. at 315-16.40. 25 N.Y.2d at 231, 250 N.E.2d at 482, 303 N.Y.S.2d at 392-93. The courtreferred to the following for support: RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS§ 32, comment g (1967) ("designated State"); RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 18,comment e (1942) ("designated State"). See Henry & Co. v. Johnson, 178 Ga.541, 173 S.E. 659 (1934), to the same effect: "A party may waive process. . . . But
unless [it] has reference to some particular action intended to be instituted in someparticular court, it is void for uncertainty, if not against public policy as tending touse the court as a means of oppression and denying to the defendant any fair oppor-
tunity to be heard."
French law requires that, in order to contractually oust the French court ofits natural forum, the French citizen must execute a formal waiver referring notonly to the exclusive jurisdiction of a foreign court but also expressly renouncing
certain privileges granted by the French Civil Code. Cie. Luxembourgeoise d'Assur.Le Foyer v. Dulac, Cass. Civ., Nov. 13, 1957, 1958 Rev. Crit, Cr. Int. Pr. 738. Other-wise a foreign judgment will not be given effect by the French courts. Battifol,Traite Elementaire de Croit Internationale Prive 814 (4th ed. 1967). Such a waiver
will not be recognized unless the French court is satisfied that the party was awarethat he was agreeing to the foreign court's jurisdiction and that such an agreement
was not part of an adhesion contract. Cie. Gen. Trans. v. Peltier fr., Cass. Req. Mar.2, 1909, 1.384. See note 61 infra and accompanying text.
41. 25 N.Y.2d at 235, 250 N.E.2d at 484, 303 N.Y.S.2d at 396.
[VOL. XXX
ATLAS CREDIT CORP. v. EZRINE
IV. WAIVER
Courts traditionally have avoided the necessity of deciding whether
cognovit judgments violated due process requirements of notice by
finding that the debtor's consent, as embodied in the instrument, was
sufficient to overcome any constitutional infirmities which might other-
wise have been present.42 The debtor's authorization of any attorney
to appear for him and confess judgment has been considered to be a
waiver of process, by which the defendant yields his right to notice
of the time and place of hearing and his opportunity to be heard.
Whether this consent actually constitutes a waiver is a question not
heretofore adequately dealt with.43
Although constitutional rights can be waived, courts indulge every
reasonable presumption against their waiver. The Supreme Court's
definition of "waiver" was stated in Johnson v. Zerbst :44 "A waiver
is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment of a known right or privi-
lege."'45 Subsequent Supreme Court decisions dealing with the waiver
of fundamental constitutional rights make it clear that, for such a
waiver to occur, not only must there be a choice which is made with
clear understanding of its consequences, but there must be an "absence
of subverting factors so that the choice is clearly free and responsible. '46
If the choice is made as the result of duress or misleading statements,
no matter what the procurer's intention, it does not constitute a
waiver.' 7  Cases involving the right to a jury trial,48 the right to
counsel,49 the privilege against self-incrimination,50 and protections
against illegal searches and seizures5 have added precision to the
concept of waiver of fundamental constitutional rights. For example,
the mere fact that a defendant has been silent, even after having been
appraised of his rights, will not constitute a waiver of such rights ;2
neither will acquiescence due to lack of knowledge of his rights or
lack of understanding of the consequences of waiver.53 In each case
involving a waiver of fundamental rights, the court will examine the
particular facts and circumstances surrounding the waiver in ad-
dition to the background, experience and conduct of the waivor.54
42. Cf. Green Mountain College v. Levine, 120 Vt. 288, 139 A.2d 827 (1958).
"Personal service may be waived by consent, or agreement, or by designating an agent
to receive service of process. . . . And if such waiver occurs there is no violation
of due process."
43. See note 29 supra.
44. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
45. Id. at 464.
46. Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 721-24 (1948).
47. Id. at 729.
48. See, e.g., Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy ex rel. Bogash, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937).
49. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Johnson v. Zerbst,
304 U.S. 458 (1938).
50. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468-70 (1966) ; Empak v. United
States, 349 U.S. 190, 197-98 (1955).
51. See, e.g., Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1920) (where there is
coercion, no valid waiver exists).
52. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
53. See Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708 (1948).
54. See note 44 supra.
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The waivor's education and mental capacity are two elements often
considered. 5
While most of the rules of waiver have evolved through decisions
in criminal law, they should be no less applicable to civil situations
involving constitutional rights. This position was taken by Mr. Justice
Black in his dissent in National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent5 6
In National Equipment the Supreme Court, by a 5-4 decision, decided
that service had been made upon "an agent authorized by appointment,"
in compliance with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 4(d), when
made in accordance with a provision in a lease agreement whereby
an agent unknown to the defendant was appointed to receive service
for the defendant in any cause of action arising under the lease. Since
the defendant had, in fact, received notice of the suit, the majority
found no need to deal with a due process question; the Court indi-
cated, however, that, had notice not been received, a different result
would have followed."' In his dissent Mr. Justice Black argued that
the mere inclusion in the lease of a clause stating that the defendant,
a Michigan farmer, thereby designated an unknown New Yorker to
be his agent was "too weak an imitation of a genuine agreement to
be treated as a waiver of so important a constitutional safeguard as
is the right to be sued at home." ' Black sought support for this prop-
osition from criminal law authority:"
Waivers of constitutional rights to be effective, this Court has
said, must be deliberately and understandingly made and can be
established only ,by clear, unequivocal, and unambiguous language.
It strains credulity to suggest that these Michigan farmers ever
read this contractual provision about Mrs. Weinberg [the New
York agent] and about "accepting service of any process within
the State of New York." And it exhausts credulity to think that
they or any other laymen reading these legalistic words would
have known or even suspected that they amounted to an agree-
ment of the Szukhents to let the company sue them in New York
should any controversy arise. This Court should not permit val-
uable constitutional rights to be destroyed by any such sharp con-
tractual practices. 60
55. Cf. Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173 (1946) ; Adams v. United States ex rel.
McCann, 317 U.S. 269 (1942).
56. See National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 332 (1964)
(dissenting opinion).
57. Id. at 315:
We need not and do not in this case reach the situation where no personal
notice has been given to the defendant. Since the respondents did in fact receive
complete and timely notice of the lawsuit pending against them, no due process
claim has been made. The case before us is therefore quite different from cases
where there was no actual notice, such as Schroeder v. City of New York, 371
U.S. 208; Walker v. Hutchinson City, 352 U.S. 112 and Mullane v. Central
Hanover Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306.
58. 375 U.S. at 332. See note 40 supra for the French attitude toward waiver.
59. 375 U.S. at 332 n.20.
60. Id. at 332.
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These same arguments should be considered in deciding whether to
recognize the validity of cognovit agreements since, like the lease in-
volved in National Equipment, they are private contracts. Since the
judicial system sanctions their use by judgment entries based upon
the authority granted in the agreement, the court should assure itself
that the debtor has been fully apprised of his rights and of the effect
which a waiver of those rights would have.61
In examining the facts and circumstances of particular cogno-
vits, a distinction should be made between the consumer and com-
mercial contexts. The consumer-debtor generally is not in a position
of strength when dealing with the creditor; nor does he ordinarily
possess sufficient knowledge and understanding of the law to be able
to appreciate the consequences of a waiver of his rights to notice and
to an opportunity to defend. In the commercial situation a waiver of
notice may justifiably be considered effective since ordinarily neither
party occupies a superior bargaining position 62 and since a real purpose
is served by allowing the use of a cognovit coupled with a waiver of
notice; the parties are generally able to bargain on an equal footing
and have a more sophisticated knowledge of the contractual practices
involved and of their results. Had the New York court in Ezrine con-
sidered the question of waiver in this context, it might have found the
waiver to have been effective.
An argument typically advanced in support of the constitution-
ality of cognovit judgments without notice is that the defendant may
always petition the court to reopen or vacate the judgment.63  Several
61. See Developments in the Law, State Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARv. L. Rv.
909, 944-45 (1960), where it is suggested that all consents given prior to suit should
be' examined in light of "the relative bargaining positions of the parties" and thatjurisdiction should be disclaimed by the court in cases where the particular device is
coercive in nature. See also Von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate:
A Suggested Analysis, 79 HA.v. L. REv. 1121, 1138-39 (1966), suggesting the danger
of coercion in cases where consent is obtained before an action is instituted and that
the courts should examine all prior consents to determine whether the agreement was
a fair one.
62. It has been commented that the statutory rights of commercial debtors are
more readily waived than those given ordinary debtors. 6 CoRBIN oN CO NTRACTs 983
(1950). Underlying the decision in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337
(1969), are similar considerations of both the type of property taken (there, wages)
and the type of debtor (there, a wage-earner) involved. See, however, the concurring
opinion of Justice Harlan, suggesting that due process may be satisfied only by
providing the type of notice and opportunity to defend which will allow a determi-
nation of the validity of the underlying claim before the debtor is deprived of any
property or its use. Id. at 343.
63. Necessarily, one making the motion [to strike out a confessed judgment]
assumes the burden of supporting the facts alleged in it, and as to all matters
not going to the merits of the controversy, such as surprise or deceit in the
entry of the judgment itself, he must prove such facts by a fair preponderance
of the evidence. But as to defenses going to the merits of the claim upon which
the judgment rests, a different rule prevails. In such cases, if the evidence
adduced in support of the motion is sufficient to persuade the fair and reasonedjudgment of an ordinary man that there are substantial and sufficient grounds for
an actual controversy as to the merits of the case, the defendant should be deemed
to have met the burden of showing that he has a meritorious defense.
Remsburg v. Baker, 212 Md. 465, 469, 129 A.2d 687 688 (1957), quoting Keiner v.
Commerce Trust Co., 154 Md. 366, 141 A. 121 (I92). See Cropper v. Graves, 216
Md. 229, 139 A.2d 721 (1958); Note, Translating Sympathy for Deceived Consumers
into Effective Programs for Protection, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 395, 418-19 (1966),
pointing out the unfairness of a system which does not provide the consumer with an
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
Supreme Court decisions suggest that such an argument does not
satisfy due process objections. Once a debtor has been deprived of
his property by execution or otherwise, the original lack of due process
is not cured by the possibility of a second proceeding. In order to be
effective, the opportunity to be heard must be granted at a meaningful
time and in a meaningful manner. In Armstrong v. Manzo,64 the
Supreme Court noted that the right to be heard was of little value
unless the defendant had prior notice and could appear at the proper
time to contest the action. That case involved a proceeding to set
aside an adoption decree that had previously been entered against
petitioner without giving him notice. The Court held that the decree
had not been issued in accordance with due process and that this con-
stitutional infirmity could not be cured by affording a subsequent hear-
ing to the defendant on his motion to set aside the decree. In Griffin
v. Griffin,65 a court order was entered declaring that petitioner owed
to respondent both alimony in arrears and accrued interest. A judg-
ment was subsequently entered without notice to the defendant, pur-
porting to allow immediate execution in the amount of the arrears
plus the interest. The Court noted that "[e]ven though petitioner
could, if he knew of the judgment before execution is actually levied,
move to set the judgment aside, that could not save the judgment from
its due process infirmity, since it and the New York practice purport
to authorize the levy of execution before petitioner is notified of the
proceeding or the judgment. ' 66
V. COGNOVITs AND MORTGAGES As SECURITY DEVICES
Judgments by confession present a rather unique problem with
respect to notice and due process requirements; since the judgment
itself merely creates a lien on any property which the debtor may
possess, it does not constitute a deprivation of property and so is not
subject to the fourteenth amendment's requirement of due process.
In this sense the cognovit judgment is comparable to an ordinary
mortgage since both are security devices. In each case the debtor
retains control over and use of his property, in contrast to the situation
under attachment or garnishment procedures which allow a creditor
immediate possession of the debtor's property."7 In each of the latter
cases, the debtor immediately suffers the loss of the use of his property
opportunity to present defenses before an execution on the judgment and also that few
persons would be willing to pay the high fee "to unravel something which should have
been straightened out in the first instance when the complaint was originally made."
64. 380 U.S. 545 (1965).
65. 327 U.S. 220 (1946).
66. Id. at 232.
67. See Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969); Comment, The
Constitutional Validity of Attachment in Light of Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,
17 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 837 (1970). See MD. R.P. G41c, under which the debtor's
property may be seized before maturity of the plaintiff's claim. The attachment
binds not only the property of the defendant in the hands of a garnishee at the time
it is laid, but also such property as may come into the hands of the garnishee at any
time before trial and judgment. Messall v. Suburban Trust Co., 244 Md. 502, 224
A.2d 419 (1966).
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if the creditor chooses to exercise his right. Thus, to hold that an
entry of judgment deprives the debtor of his property without due
process of law would require not only a finding that the waiver or
the power of attorney was invalid, but also a finding that the imposi-
tion of a mere lien constitutes a deprivation. The New York court
in Ezrine, by failing to distinguish between the imposition of a cog-
novit judgment lien and its execution, went further than necessary
when it included the mere entry of cognovit judgments -in the category
of deprivations.
Since due process is violated only upon execution without notice,
a judgment by confession entered in accordance with a statute such
as Maryland's is no more objectionable than any ordinary default
judgment.6" The New York court in the instant case found that there
would be no due process objection with respect to a default judgment
since notice must be given to the debtor before its entry.6 9 Under the
Maryland rule for confession of judgment,70 notice is provided in time
for the debtor to present defenses to the action before his property is
in any way interfered with; the procedure is, therefore, constitutionally
sound. The cognovit procedures of other states, which, based on
the concept of waiver, allow execution without prior notice, may be
defective.
As cognovit judgments are security devices, their availability to
potential creditors can enable consumers or commercial debtors to
obtain credit more easily. When compared with other practices em-
ployed by creditors to obtain a security interest,7" cognovits actually
place the debtor in a more favorable position.72 In the mortgage situ-
ation, for example, interests and incidental expenses such as those for
title searches and insurance are high, the time factor needed to secure
loan approval is great, and such loans, being best suited for long term
transactions, are often unavailable to the everyday consumer. Even
if we assume that the debtor has the time to expend in seeking such
a loan and does in fact receive it, the creditor will almost always be
able to obtain a default judgment if the schedule of payments is not
met by the debtor. Since this is the exact result afforded by a cog-
novit judgment (assuming that, as in Maryland, the judgment is not
enforceable until notice is given), a cognovit can be as effective a
68. Prior to the entry of a default judgment, process must have been served so
that the debtor is made aware of the pending action; and the plaintiff must have filed
a good cause of action. Atlas Credit Corp. v. Ezrine, 25 N.Y.2d 219, 250 N.E2d 474,
303 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1969). But see Katz, The Law and the Low Income Consumer,
3 COLUM. J. OF LEGAL & SocIAL PROBLEMS (1967), pointing out that default judg-
ments are also subject to abuse despite service of process.
69. 25 N.Y2d at 227, 250 N.E.2d at 479, 303 N.Y.S.2d at 388, citing 49 C.J.S.
Judgments § 193 (1947).
70. MD. R1P. 645.
71. For example, mortgages, garnishment, and assignment of wages. See Note,
Confessions of Judgment, 102 U. PA. L. Rsv. 524, 535 (1954).
72. A cognovit judgment procedure may be no more susceptible to abuse than
the procedure upheld over due process and equal protection arguments in Wheeler v.
Adams Co., Civil No. 70-1087-k (D. Md., Jan. 25, 1971). That case involved the
procedure under MD. R.P. BQ, by which a conditional vendor may replevy the goods
on his ex parte showing of a prima facie case and the filing of an habendum bond.
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security device as a mortgage while involving less time, effort, and
expense on the part of the debtor.
VI. CRITICISMS
Perhaps the most valid objection to the use of cognovit clauses
arises in the case of the ordinary consumer, who is unlikely to have
knowledge of their effect. 73 An unconscionable situation exists when
the prospective debtor is presented with an application form which
contains, among a multitude of other technical terms, a cognovit clause.
He is generally unaware that he is signing anything except a credit
application.7 4 He is completely in the hands of his creditor, who has
the advantages of superior knowledge and bargaining power.75
Current cognovit statutes provide little protection when creditors
seek judgments on unjustified claims. 76 A statement of facts out of
which the debt arose will not prevent such abuse since no answer or
defense on the debtor's part is required before entry of or execution
on the judgment takes place. While the judgment may be opened and
vacated on grounds of fraud,77 if the property has been disposed
of by an execution sale without prior notice to the debtor, the debtor
is left with no effective remedy. Although the debtor might maintain
a civil suit for damages against the creditor, he may not be in a posi-
73. Commentators on the use of the cognovit have repeatedly stated that the
consumer neither expects nor understands such clauses in consumer contracts. See,
e.g., Comment, Abolition of the Confession of Judgment Note in Retail Installment
Sales Contracts in Pennsylvania, 73 Dicx. L. Rxv. 115, 116, 118 (1968): "[Ilnvariably
the low-income consumer is completely uninformed concerning the nature and conse-
quences of his signing such an instrument at the time of the sale. . . . [W]hile it
has been repeatedly held that the defendant's signature upon the judgment note con-
stitutes consent to waiver of notice, such 'consent' is fictitious since the low income
consumer understands neither the character nor possible ramifications of the note."
See also Swarb v. Lennox, 314 F. Supp. 1091, 1097 (E.D. Pa. 1970), discussing the
results of a survey of debtors in default in Philadelphia and three other major cities.
Most debtors had annual incomes of less than $6000, had limited educational back-
grounds and, of 236 debtors who were aware that they had signed a contract, only
14% knew that the contract contained a confession of judgment clause.
74. See Pyes, Reappraisal of the Confession of Judgment Law, 48 IuL. B.J. 764(1960) ; Note, Translating Sympathy for Deceived Consumers into Effective Programs
for Protection, 114 U. PA. L. Rv. 395, 418-19 (1966).
75. See National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 333 (1963)(dissenting opinion), which clearly underlined the unconscionable aspect of a lease
agreement by which the defendant had appointed an agent to accept process. The
three dissenting justices noted that such clauses were often so buried within the text
of the contract that they were never really read by the defendant. They expressed the
opinion that, since the corporate plaintiff prepared the printed form contract, the
individual purchaser should not be bound by the appointment despite his signature on
the contract unless the plaintiff can prove that the debtor was aware that he was
signing a power of attorney.
76. Cf. Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928), where the Court found that aNew Jersey statute which provided for service of process on nonresident motorists
violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment by failing to contain
provisions assuring that the defendant would receive notice. If such notice were not
required to be sent to the nonresident, then the possibility existed that unfounded
claims would be prosecuted against absent defendants. The Court reasoned that a
"provision of law for service that leaves open such a clear opportunity for the com-
mission of fraud ... or injustice is not a reasonable provision, and ... would certainly
be depriving a defendant of his property without due process of law." Id. at 19.
77. See note 63 supra.
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tion to do so. 78  Cognovit procedures allowing execution before the
giving of notice may also endanger the credit of the consumer without
giving him the opportunity to defend against the action. In a society
where credit sales form the bulk of our business transactions, this
possibility poses a serious threat to the small consumer who may be
unable to secure the necessities of daily living without signing credit
agreements containing cognovit clauses.
The pressure which may be exerted by creditors after they obtain
cognovit judgments is another area of concern. The creditor may
attempt to use the judgment lien which he has obtained to force the
debtor into a higher or accelerated schedule of payments or an in-
creased interest rate as a price of retaining his property."'
In Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp."' the Supreme Court recog-
nized these very problems when it held that a Wisconsin statute pro-
viding for garnishment of wages violated the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment in that notice and opportunity to defend were
not given before the in rem seizure of wages."' The Sniadach decision
arguably could be confined to wage garnishment since "wages are a
specialized type of property presenting distinct problems . .. But
wage garnishment is analogous to the creation of a judgment lien on
property, as both can be used by the creditor as weapons with which
to compel -the debtor to accept the creditor's accounting of the debt;
a real concern behind the Court's holding was the debtor's position in
today's society :83
"The debtor whose wages are tied up by a writ of garnish-
ment, and who is usually in need of money, is in no position to
resist demands for collection fees. If the debt is small, the debtor
will be under considerable pressure to pay the debt and collection
charges in order to get his wages back. If the debt is large, he
will often sign a new contract of 'payment schedule' which incor-
porates these additional charges."8 4
78. Cf. Note, Translating Sympathy for Deceived Consumers into Effective
Programs of Protection, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 395, 418-19 (1966).
79. Cf. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 341 n.6.
80. 395 U.S. 337 (1969). See also Ware v. Phillips, 468 P.2d 444 (Wash. 1970),
where the Supreme Court of Washington, en banc, held that the entry of a defaultjudgment under Washington's garnishment statute against garnishees, without notice
to them that a claim had been asserted and that if they failed to answer a judgment
would be entered in the amount of the claim, was a denial of due process.
81. A three-judge panel of the District Court for the District of Columbia has
upheld pre-judgment wage garnishment where the wage-earner is a nonresident of
the forum state and where the wage garnishment statute allows it to be quashed if
the wage-earner files affidavits contradicting the plaintiff's prima fade case. Under
the statute the wage-earner could request a jury trial of issues raised by such traverse.
Tucker v. Burton, 319 F. Supp. 567 (D.C.D.C. 1970). There is a dissent by Judge
Wright. Id. at 572.
82. 395 U.S. at 340.
83. Id. at 340, 342 n.9. See also Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
84. 395 U.S. at 341 n.6, quoting Comment, Wage Garnishment in Washington -
An Empirical Study, 43 WASH. L. Rv. 743, 753 (1968). See Note, The Constitutional
Validity of Attachment in Light of Family Finance Corp., 17 U.C.L.A.L. REv.
837, 840 (1970).
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The reasoning of the Sniadach Court is equally applicable to cog-
novit situations involving the small consumer (as opposed to the cor-
porate or commercial debtor). The same type of economic hardship
may exist; the same type of pressure may be exerted."8 The solution
in the one case may be equally that of the other: the defendant must be
given his day in court before he is deprived of his property.
The Supreme Court noted in Sniadach that under certain circum-
stances property may be attached without notice,"6 but did not consider
wage garnishment as ordinarily falling within such circumstances; the
creditor's interest in debt collection was thus subordinated to the
debtor's interest in having a hearing before seizure of his wages. An
examination of the cases cited by the Court indicates that only a strong
state interest 87 or a concern for public welfare 8 would justify an attach-
ment without a prior hearing. The need of a creditor to execute upon
a cognovit judgment before notice is extended to the consumer-debtor
does not seem sufficiently compelling to meet these criteria.8 9
State legislation has evidenced concern over the unconscionability
of the use of cognovit judgments in the consumer sector by forbidding
their use in small loan transactions and in retail installment sales. 0
With the exception of Ohio, Illinois and Pennsylvania, all states have
at least some restriction in one or both of these areas. Uniform
statutes such as the Uniform Commercial Code and the Uniform
Consumer Credit Code have also followed a pattern of restriction.
Under the U.C.C., adopted in every state but Louisiana, the nego-
tiability of an instrument is not affected by a term "authorizing a
confession of judgment on the instrument if it 'is not paid when
due."91 The implication of this language is that a note is not nego-
tiable if it contains a term authorizing a confession of judgment prior
to default, and this is in fact the position taken by the comment to
section 3-112.92 The imposition of non-negotiability, while not affect-
85. Cf. Katz, The Law and the Low Income Consumer, 3 COLUM. J. OF LEGAL
AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS (1967), suggesting that our legal order is often ineffective inprotecting the poor, who can ill afford to spend several working days in court.
86. 395 U.S. at 339.
87. E.g., Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921).
88. E.g., Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594, 598-600 (1950).
89. Cf. Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956), implying that there
must be compelling or at least persuasive reasons in order to dispense with giving
the best notice possible.
90. See Hopson, Cognovit Judgments: An Ignored Problem of Due Process and
Full Faith and Credit, 29 U. CHI. L. REv. 111 (1961), for a review of the different
state statutes and their varied restrictions. MD. ANN. CODE art. 58A, § 19(a) (Supp.1970) prohibits the use of cognovits in small loan transactions; MD. ANN. CODE art.
83, § 130 (1969) prohibits their use in retail installment sales contracts. During the1969 term, the Maryland legislature considered three bills (H.B. 712, 793 and S.B. 138)
seeking to prohibit their use altogether. In June, 1970, a three-judge panel of the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania ruled that entry of confessed judgment againstPennsylvania residents with incomes under $10,000, who had signed leases or con-
sumer sales contracts containing cognovit clauses but who had exercised no intelligentwaiver of process, was violative of the due process clause. Swarb v. Lennox, 314 P.
Supp. 1091 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
91. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-112(1) (d). See Atlas Credit Corp. v.Leonard, WILLIER & HART, U.C.C. REPORTER DIGEST 2-740 (1956) ; compare Westring
v. Cheyenne Nat'l Bank, 393 P.2d 119 (Wyo. 1964), where the court held that a termin a note authorizing judgment by confession does not affect negotiability.
92. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-112, comment 2.
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ing the validity of a term of the latter type as between the original
parties, renders instruments containing such terms much less useful
to a lender who is accustomed to discounting such instruments. The
U.C.C.C., presently in effect in only four states,93 has gone even
further by making any authorization for a confession of judgment
automatically void."
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In the absence of an effective waiver, it is apparent that in order
to satisfy current jurisdictional and procedural standards of due process,
some type of notice must be provided to debtors before a levy of
execution is permitted pursuant to a cognovit judgment. A procedure
such as Maryland's for judgment by confession satisfies those standards
of due process developed by the United States Supreme Court. In the
commercial context, because of the sophistication of the parties, the
nature of the business venture, and the size of the capital outlay, the
debtor should be allowed to waive whatever protection that notice
provides. In the consumer situation, because of the obvious danger of
unconscionable creditor action, any waiver executed by the debtor
should be carefully examined by the court, which should place the
burden of proving its validity on the creditor.
93. Indiana, Oklahoma, Utah and Wyoming. CCII CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE
4770.
94. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE §§ 2.415, 3.407. In addition to the general
prohibition, the UCCC prevents a buyer, lessee or debtor from waiving or otherwise
agreeing to forego his rights or benefits under the act, by making such a waiver
ineffective.
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